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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 05/03/2011

Accident number: 646

Accident time: 12:15

Accident Date: 11/10/2009

Where it occurred: MF 5274, Kar Kar
village, Baghlan
district, Baghlan,
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: Not recorded

ID original source: OPS, 14/01-28

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 05/03/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some
formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as
more information becomes available.
The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
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Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)
File: OPS, 14/01-28
Date: December 1st 2009
Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] - MDG -13
DEMINING ACCIDENT
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] -MDG13 demining accident occurred on 11 October 2009 in Kar Kar village, Baghlan district of
Baghlan Province.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group]- DG-13 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC NE to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] MDG-13. The accident occurred at
12:15 hours, 11 Oct 2009 in Task # AF/13/1312/32114/MF 5274 located in Kar Kar village,
Baghlan district of Baghlan Province.
SUMMARY:
Task # AF/13/1312/32114/MF 5274 is an anti-personnel mine contaminated area which was
recorded by LIS under the community No. 1473 SHA 01 then polygon by [another demining
group]. This area was mined during the internal war from 1996-2001 because of its location
from the military point of view. As the area was of military importance for both side of conflict
faction, so was hand to hand between them and they put mines to prevent their positions from
the attacks of each other. So far 2 accidents on human and 3 on animal have been reported
in this area. Size of the area is 39150sqm. During the clearance operation, 33770sqm area
cleared and 34 anti-personnel mines were found/destroyed by MDG-13.
On 11 Oct 2009 at 12:15 am while [the Victim] deminer was excavating a detected signal in
his clearance lane, his bayonet hit top of an anti-personnel mine and caused it to go off.
According to the investigation report, it seems that the deminer started the excavation drill
directly from the centre of the detected signal by his bayonet and caused the mine to be
exploded. The deminer had the PPE and visor but as the visor was not properly used so he
got some superficial injuries on his face, eyes.
CONCLUSIONS:
However the victim was a trained and experienced deminer and there was no any obvious
point of concern with him, but he was careless during the investigation of detected signal. The
other important point outlined in investigation report was: "the assistant team leader was
unable to control and supervise the deminers under his supervision", and he is lack of basic
knowledge of reading and writing.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
A. It is the responsibilities of respective IP's operations department to make sure that a proper
system of command and control exists in the field,
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B. Inappropriate use of visor resulted in injuries to the eyes and face of involved deminer,
therefore, all the command groups are strongly recommended to strengthen their focus on
this point and never allow their deminers to use the PPE inappropriately.
C. The [Demining group] Operations department is to take more professional steps to build up
and develop a strong capacity of command and control mechanism within their teams and
assign qualified people as Team Leader, Asst Team Leader and Section Leaders.
D. Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required
to be submitted to the MACCA OPS department by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue
date of this letter.

Victim Report
Victim number: 829

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Eyes, minor Face
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the Victim was working inappropriately with his visor raised and his
error was not corrected. The Investigators criticised the quality of the field supervision, which
had no effective control. The provision of appropriately qualified, experienced and effective
field supervision is a management responsibility so the secondary cause is listed as a
Management Control Inadequacy.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary
implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the
UN to share it with others is regrettable.
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